Pharma Reform

As early as the mid- to late- 1980s the market started to become increasingly managed (think formularies) and the availability of many inexpensive generic antibiotics even then made it easy to set superiority expectations for new market entries.

About the same time, the widespread use of antibiotics rightfully started to raise concerns with the Infectious Disease community about the development of resistance.  Armed with microbiology data and clinical studies, formularies and treatment guidelines were developed to encourage appropriate antibiotic use.  Selectively targeted narrow spectrum treatments were preferred to the mindless routine use of broad spectrum agents.  To preserve their antimicrobial activity, the use of some uniquely effective agents was further restricted to prior approval by Infectious Disease specialists.

While these were responsible and commendable actions taken, they presented the pharmaceutical industry with a new set of expectations for developing antibiotics. The message was clear.  If you want your new antibiotic to be used and you want to be paid a premium price for it, you better have the data (comparative effectiveness) to support that it is better than what we already have (including generic alternatives) and be able to prove it is worth the money (comparative value) you want to charge.  And, even if it is that good and costs that much, we are going to make sure it is used selectively in only those patients who absolutely need it.

This wasn’t and still isn’t a very attractive investment opportunity for the industry given the ease of tweaking molecules and the lack of market resistance in other therapeutic categories. Even for companies that decided to have a go at antibiotic drug development, it hasn’t been a very easy road to market.  The few products that have gotten approved and done well were able to demonstrate or at least imply a clinical advantage over other drugs.

Now the industry and the FDA are faced with trying to figure out how to design trials that would allow for fair comparisons of different antibiotics.  Not satisfied with clinical “non-inferiority” the FDA and the industry seem deadlocked in trial design limbo.  More importantly for the industry, the market expectation is for superiority anyway. The company will need near impossible – to – obtain “substantial evidence” in their clinical data to obtain an FDA approved superiority claim needed to promote the antibiotic as superior.

Could other therapeutic categories become similarly unattractive for drug development?  When market expectations and regulatory hurdles become impractical and seemingly financially infeasible pharmaceutical companies will make one of two choices.  They will take on the task in hopes of beating the challenging circumstances so they can charge a super premium price when they bring that superior product to market.   Or, more likely, they will gravitate to therapeutic categories with lower market expectations and fewer regulatory hurdles.

Many pharmaceutical companies will fail making the first choice and many diseases will never have optimal treatments given the second choice.

mike@pharmareform.com

NIH (not invented here) is probably dead or at least dying at most Big Pharma today as is the thinking that companion diagnostics are not commercially interesting because they imply smaller market opportunities.  But, are there other research maxims that need to be reevaluated in the context of the evolving new healthcare market?  Here are 5 to consider changing if your company still thinking this way:

• “kill early, kill fast”

This has been intended to encourage researchers to cut losses by quickly identifying drug candidates that have a high probability of failing in later trials because of safety concerns or lack of efficacy.   Poor Phase 1 or Phase 2 results may raise concerns about mass market use of the product but may not necessarily reflect how the drug candidate might perform in a more targeted population.  Think personalized medicine with companion diagnostics.  A more comprehensive understanding of the disease, product pharmacokinetics, and pharmacogenomics may be needed to avoid killing promising compounds for smaller, targeted patient groups with significant unmet medical needs.

• “what’s the fastest, commercially viable indication that will get us to market”

The thinking behind this was that “we can use the scientific literature and medical education to expand the market.”  This will become increasingly difficult as the FDA, CMS, and the managed market become more demanding for label indications and data to support claims for use and reimbursement.  Relying on traditional sales and marketing tactics to fill the label claim or data voids to expand market opportunities will be less likely and less tolerated in the evolving new healthcare market.

• “if we do that study or analyze that data, we might find something we don’t want to know”

Product liability cases continue to make headlines and the ability for pharmaceutical companies to “bury” findings, mislead the market, cover-up or ignore potential safety issues or inferior efficacy results is becoming increasingly difficult.  Research organizations might as well assume that if they know or suspect an issue, they will need to explore it, get the science behind it, and be forthcoming about the findings.

• “our research is built around (you name the biological target) program”

As many “target-based” biotechnology companies and Big Pharma research programs have found, this is a very high risk strategy of  “either it works or it doesn’t work” (betting black or red at the roulette table).  In the evolving new healthcare market where proven innovation and differentiation are going to be essential for commercial success,  I believe companies that take a more comprehensive approach to understanding the pathophysiology of the disease will have more opportunities to discover and develop ways to intervene in the disease process, will better understand how different targets interact with each other, and will reduce the risk of betting on a single target.

• “we can do it cheaper and better in house”

Market expectations for innovative and differentiated product profiles will make research pipelines more variable than they have been in the past.  The days of merely bringing any safe and effective product through the regulatory development process and onto the market are gone.  Disciplined research portfolio management will eliminate those products that will not meet market expectations, creating more dramatic time gaps, and making pipeline flow less consistent than in the past.  This will require research flexibility of facilities, equipment, and staffing.  While a core team of research expertise is essential to retain in-house, most laboratory, preclinical, and clinical work can now be outsourced to well staffed, competent CROs that often have as much if not more expertise, capabilities, and capacity than the research teams at Big Pharma.  Even at higher per project costs, these incremental expenses will be far lower than the inevitable up-sizing and downsizing of staff or the carrying costs of intermittently idle facilities, equipment, and staffing.

mike@pharmareform.com

So what keeps representatives from having more engaging, more informative, and more credible discussions with physicians?  One of the most frequent reasons, or excuses, I hear about is the regulatory constraints placed on representatives.  Regulatory restrictions get in the way of being more effective as a sales representative when opportunities for product use exceed the label claims or where representatives could drive more sales by implying or even making comparative claims they can’t support with label claims or “substantial evidence.”

To ensure regulatory compliance, many companies, especially those with Department of Justice Corporate Integrity Agreements, now require representatives to stick to verbatim scripted presentations that mostly do not resonate well with physicians.  This “regurgitation of the company message” is an immediate turnoff for physicians, lacks credibility, and makes for awkward representative – physician interactions.

Now, keep in mind the premise of our discussion here. You are a professional representative and your mindset and focus is on making sure patients in your territory are getting the best treatment possible.  You are not just “driving sales” by doing and saying whatever it takes to get physicians to prescribe your product as much as possible.   Professional representatives don’t need to be reminded of fair balance or to stick to label claims and approved literature, they just do.  The challenge for them is whether or not they have the claims and sufficient regulatory compliant data and literature to meet the information needs of their customers.

Some sales representatives might suggest that they have all they need in terms of claims and published data and regulatory is just getting in the way.  If that is the case, then why would there be a regulatory compliance issue?  Why is regulatory review such a big deal?  Why would companies and representatives feel a need to promote off-label to make their sales? Why would companies feel compelled to script boring marketing messages to ensure sales representative compliance? More importantly, why is the market still clamoring for more comparative trials and better data to help them identify best treatment options for patients?

In this competitive market and knowing that products we now have were developed with a “get it to market “ mentality and indication – driven clinical trials to satisfy regulatory requirements for safety and efficacy, I’m going to suggest you do not have the claims or data you need.  How many of your products have two well controlled comparative efficacy trials to support claims of differentiation that you can use in sales presentations?  Can you claim superiority?  If not, how can you discuss why your product is better than another for a particular patient type? Can you do this and be compliant with regulatory requirements or are you expected to just cleverly implying a difference?

Here is the problem.   Even today, research gets the indications and it is up to marketing and sales to differentiate the product in the market.  When a physician or managed plan decision-maker asks why they should use your product rather than a competitive product, how do you answer?  Blatant claims of superiority or implied differentiation are the only way to convince them why your product should be used over another product.

What’s interesting is that when research and management talk about products to investors or in company presentations, especially before launch, they talk about and always answer questions about how the product is better than anything else out there, often using historical data from competitive products compared to their just released clinical data.  They highlight all the wonderful features and benefits that your product has over the competition, even quote data that imply superiority.

But, when marketing and sales wants to take those same messages to the market they have this regulatory issue.  While the research and management statements may be true,  they don’t necessarily come with the label claims or “substantial evidence” to support those same claims in advertising and promotion.  Yet, revenue forecasts are driven off those claims and expectations for differentiation.   And besides, who ever launched a product that wasn’t considered by their research team and management to be better than anything out there?

Pharmaceutical companies can no longer expect, pharmaceutical representatives to fill the label claim and “substantial evidence” data void for products.  The disconnect between product differentiation assumptions used for revenue forecasts and the regulatory constrained messaging puts the representative in an unfair position of having to deliver sales expectations beyond that which would be or ever could be achievable given a compliant presentation.

To be effective, even professional representatives need regulatory compliant information, comprehensive label claims, and more importantly, “substantial evidence” documented in peer-reviewed published literature.  This is the responsibility of management and the research team.  It is then marketing’s responsibility to develop forecasts that are aligned with the label claims and regulatory compliant information available for presentations and discussions by representatives.   mike@pharmareform.com

If we are trying to figure out how sales representatives can add value, we must start with those who will determine whether or not there is value being added… the customer.  This may be obvious to some, especially sales representatives, but over the past several decades pharmaceutical industry management has characterized the “value added” in the context of what sales representatives can do for the company or the product and not what sales representatives can do for the customer.  So let’s start with the customer (which is not just physicians in the evolving new healthcare market) and what their needs are and how we can add value by meeting or exceeding those expectations.

I don’t want to get off on a tangent but the needs and expectations I’m talking about here are not for things like lunches being delivered or a return of the tchotchkes.  Unfortunately, the industry trained physician offices into developing these expectations in lieu of meaningful clinical discussions about products.

So let’s review some of the evolving market expectations for pharmaceuticals that the industry must be ready to meet, especially in light of healthcare reform:

• Safe and effective products that can be differentiated (clinically proven and with label claims where possible) from currently available treatment options (including preventive medicines)
• A clear understanding with supportive data for the basic science behind the product, its mechanism of action, and rationale for efficacy and potential side effects and adverse reactions.
• Clinical data to support “comparative efficacy” and other claims of differentiation or even superiority (justify the premium pricing)
• Personalized medicine supported by biomarkers and companion diagnostics that can predict response, determine extent of response, and anticipate side effects and adverse reactions with specificity and accuracy
• Real world pharmacoeconomics data to support the economic value of the product and pricing that reflects the value being delivered. Again, justify the premium pricing.
• Hospitals will want data and methodologies to demonstrate the impact of products on newly established quality metrics and outcomes data that will be used to force rank their institution performance against national standards.

One of the first implications of meeting these more demanding market expectations is that pharmaceutical companies must readjust their thinking to be more selective in their pipeline evaluations and  a lot more comprehensive in their approach to research and development.  In the past, you could just find a compound, identify the potential indications for use, do the clinical studies, get approval, and go to market.  This traditional “get it to market” approach to R & D will deliver products and data that fall short of market expectations and hamper commercial viability of products in the evolving new healthcare market.

It also becomes apparent that regardless of the representative’s scientific or technical expertise, even the best of sales representatives will struggle to address these market expectations if the research foundation and data are lacking.  I believe this is one of the reasons sales representatives are struggling today.  Pharmaceutical research has not kept pace with the demands of the market and sales representatives are being asked to compensate for limited regulatory product labeling, a lack of product differentiation, and minimal real world clinical data that can be used in product discussions.

But let’s assume your company is committed to a much more comprehensive research approach to deliver truly innovative new products with robust data packages.  This has significant implications for how pharmaceutical sales representatives can add value for customers.   You might be surprised by some of the implications we’ll discuss in our next post.  mike@pharmareform.com

More often than not you hear Pharma defend high prescription drug prices as necessary to cover the high costs associated with pharmaceutical research and development.  Over the course of 7-10 years or longer they may spend $1.0 billion or more to get a product to market.  While the time and costs of drug development may be real, the rightfully skeptical healthcare market and patients have never really accepted this rationale for high prescription prices, often pointing to the more visible high cost of marketing and sales.  And now, this high cost of R & D rationale has become even less believable.

What makes this rationale even less believable today then ever before?  The fact that pharmaceutical companies can afford to spend tens of billions of dollars on mergers and acquisitions while dismantling the acquired companies, laying off thousands of employees (including research scientists), and at the same time, reducing the R & D investment the two merged companies might have otherwise spent.

The other area that challenges the credibility of the bogus high pricing rationale is the affordability pharmaceutical companies have to pay hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions of dollars in fines and settlements for alleged and sometimes proven wrongdoing.

Unfortunately, the billions of dollars spent on mega-mergers and litigation settlements don’t go towards producing any innovative new products.  Pfizer spent $68 billion (equal to the total annual amount of industry spending on R & D) to acquire Wyeth and Merck spent $41 billion to merge with Schering, not to mention the hundreds of millions spent by the two on restructuring, legal, and banking fees.  None of this money went to R & D.

Similarly, none of the $2.3 billion in fines and settlement Pfizer recently coughed up nor the hundreds of millions of dollars of settlement paid by other companies for their alleged indiscretions will go to R & D.   In fact, Pfizer’s $2.3 billion settlement represents more than 30% of their anticipated $6 billion spend on R& D this year.  The $2.3 billion alone would have put any other company in the top 20 of pharmaceutical companies in R & D spending.

So when Pharma says they need high prices to support R & D it is no surprise that the healthcare market and patients recoil with skepticism, frustration, and animosity.

mike@pharmareform.com

The role of the pharmaceutical sales representative (Chapter 9 in Pharmaplasia™) has been waning for some time.  The internet is full of discussions about the sales representative (“detail person”, “detail man”, “detailing”) position being dead, dying, or even obsolete. Some discussions are defensive while others are unrealistically optimistic about a return to the traditional role.  At the same time,  Pharmaceutical companies are trying to balance the challenges of physician access with the fact that pharmaceutical sales has been one of the most impactful marketing tools available.  More importantly, the pharmaceutical sales representative was probably the best way to inform, and yes, “educate” physicians about prescription drugs, especially new products.

There is a lot of blame to go around for why pharmaceutical sales is struggling for survival.  There is a rarely talked about and hidden reason but first here are a few of the more obvious and frequently complained about reasons for why pharmaceutical sales representatives find themselves either unemployed or wondering if they will still have a job at the end of the year:

Some have also postulated that the advent of electronic communications and internet availability of medical and drug information have made sales representative obsolete.  I believe electronic communications should not be seen as a threat or replacement for pharmaceutical sales but rather could be a future necessity for handling the large volume of data available and to explain the complexities of new treatment options.

Some have suggested sales and sales management brought it upon themselves with questionable sales tactics and the hiring of less than professionally or scientifically qualified sales personnel.  While these may have ultimately contributed to the continuing demise of this important position, I believe you have to dig deeper to uncover the genesis of this unfortunate evolution.

Some have blamed management for just about everything and in this case, you don’t have to be very specific, from C-level to front line managers.  Unreasonable expectations and “stretch” sales forecasts drove a lot of sales organizations and individuals to do “whatever it took” to meet those sales goals.  Sales management complied with these expectations and was bound and determined to make their incentive bonuses and ensure their place at the annual sales incentive trip.  Again, “whatever it takes” to make or exceed your numbers.

Marketing often built those sales forecasts out of hubris and pushed the sales organization to deliver while also provided the marketing message and resources to do “whatever it took” to  deliver the sales.  Think of the virtually uncontrolled, unlimited (by standards for most other industries) funding for tchotches, lunch and learns, speaker programs, and of course, samples and literature (marketing materials).  Of course reps were encouraged to fully deploy and leverage all their resources.

Some people like to blame the regulatory environment (constraints on what reps can say and do) while others point to a less tolerant healthcare market (increasingly difficult physician access and institutional limitations on promotion).  These, however, while real, were more a response to increasingly aggressive and sometimes questionable (unethical or illegal?) activities rather than being inherent in the market.

No doubt, pressure on sales representatives to make their numbers was and is intense and often requires incredible selling skills and creativity to compensate for the realities of marginal product profiles given the market expectations and sometimes even harmful side effects of the products they were selling.

This leads us to one of the less obvious sources for why I believe the sales representative position has become threatened with extinction.  And that is,  the lack of credible clinical data and appropriate regulatory labeling to support the commercial claims needed to deliver the forecast sales numbers.  Sometimes the clinical data and marketing messages provided to the sales organizations have even been inaccurate, intentionally misleading, or even concocted.

Solid credible clinical data and regulatory approved labeling to support commercial claims mitigates the need for overly aggressive and questionable sales activities and reduces the regulatory constraints that bar sales representatives from having meaningful clinical discussions with physicians.  It is hard to imagine the level of sales that might have been achieved had the talented, skilled sales representatives been armed with better clinical data and stronger, more definitive regulatory label claims.

Research teams pushed (and senior management was pushing even harder) for approval rather than building comprehensive product profiles to support the commercial expectations.  The get-it-to-market drive for approval to attain indication- based label claims without differentiation or consideration for what sales representatives will be able to say or use in promotion unfairly puts sales representatives in an awkward, boring, professionally compromised, and near impossible selling situation.

So before you blame or criticize sales and sales management for jeopardizing the pharmaceutical sales position, look at the clinical data they had to work with.  You might find that they did a better job than might have been expected and you might find the reasons they felt compelled to go to such extremes in some cases to make their sales numbers.

mike@pharmareform.com

“… Pharmaplasia is important reading for anyone with a vested interest in the pharmaceutical industry (especially those who work in it).”

(Four of Five Stars)

ForeWord CLARION Reviews

Unlike other books written about the pharmaceutical industry, Mike Wokasch, a 30 year industry veteran, delves into the causes of the industry’s current state of dysfunction.  He provides practical solutions for a prosperous future, even in light of the increasing regulatory constraints, restrictions on marketing and sales, and the demands of an increasingly cost conscious market with its own challenges imposed by healthcare reform.

The author provides an insider’s perspective with unique insights into the unintended consequences of the industry’s rapid growth and explores why some Big Pharma companies may be too big for the complexities of the science, the business, and the market.  Much like his blog PharmaReform.com, this 180 page book is not an exposé but rather a hard hitting discussion of how the industry’s mistakes and poor decisions have led to serious questions about its outdated business model, its long-term commercial viability, and the imbalance between corporate priorities for “profits and patients” that have driven product sales but often put patient health and safety at risk.

Pharmaplasia™, which is available in hard and soft cover at  www.Pharmaplasia.com,  addresses important management, organizational, functional, and philosophical questions such as:

• How will Healthcare Reform affect the pharmaceutical industry?
• What do pharmaceutical companies need to do to better align with the expectations of the market and to adapt to Healthcare Reform?
• What factors, actions, and decisions led to the current state of industry dysfunction?
• Why can’t $65 billion in annual R & D spending produce more innovative products?
• What did organizational growth do to pharmaceutical companies and the industry?
• Is the role of the pharmaceutical sales representative obsolete?
• What do pharmaceutical companies need to do to reestablish trust and credibility in the market?
• What should pharmaceutical executives focus on as they reconfigure their business models?

Industry executives and employees will relate to the historical insider perspective but more importantly, take away practical recommendations for increasing R & D productivity, preserving profitability in the face of healthcare reform, and reestablishing public trust and credibility.

Pharmaceutical industry service providers and vendors will better understand their customers and comprehend the transformative challenges the industry faces; ultimately they will be in a better position to align their products and services to the address the changing needs of the industry.

Healthcare providers will relate to how the industry needs to evolve, appreciate the need for and value of “conflict of interest-free” relationships with the industry, and gain further understanding of the important role they play in ensuring that their patients receive the best available treatment options.

Patients and the general public will enjoy the insider perspective about Big Pharma while learning what they should be able to expect from an industry we all depend upon for innovative new drug treatments that can relieve pain and suffering and save lives.

Preview Table of Contents

Preview Chapter 1

Go to www.Pharmaplasia.com

Corporate integrity should start at the top of the organization and every employee must do their share to make it a reality but pharmaceutical company physicians and scientists are the best hopes for reestablishing pharmaceutical industry trust… if they can survive in their organizations.

Integrity and objective science were once the hallmark of pharmaceutical research.   Valid testing methodologies, rigorous analysis and interpretation of data, and accurate complete disclosure of findings and understandings provide the medical community with a sound basis for making informed clinical decisions.  Too many case studies over the past several decades, however, have raised serious questions about the integrity and objectivity of pharmaceutical research.

Not to make excuses but, physicians and scientists at pharmaceutical companies are subjected to intense organizational pressures that can cajole them into compromising their objectivity and scientific integrity.  These pressures come in subtle and sometimes not so subtle forms.  Emotional attachment, satisfaction of personal ambitions, peer pressure, and management can all influence decision making and can provide a rationale for questionable actions taken.

Emotional attachment results from years and sometimes careers worth of product development, creating an instinctive need to nurture and protect “their babies”.   Wanting to maintain a positive outlook, securing incentive compensation, enhancing professional stature, and wanting to be a part of the team can all drive the behavior of individuals and groups to do things they might not otherwise consider.

Perhaps the single biggest challenge for industry physicians and scientists trying to maintain scientific integrity is dealing with the implicit and explicit demands and expectations of management.

Some of the types of scientific integrity issues we are talking about include:

• Designing studies around problems without disclosing the problem
• Data manipulation
• Covering up, hiding, or minimizing relevant negative data
• Disproportionately highlighting efficacy benefits to mitigate safety issues
• Not challenging or correcting company statements (or marketing) when they know they are scientifically not valid, incomplete, or misleading

None of these happens in a vacuum as it would be rare that they could be accomplished by a single individual without the knowledge of others.  At the same time, an individual physician or scientist puts their career at risk when they challenge organizational thinking and management prompted or endorsed indiscretions.

That being said, pharmaceutical industry physicians and scientists are often the only ones who have the corporate platform and organizational position power to guide management regarding what can be supported scientifically or what can or can not be claimed clinically.   They are in the best position to insist on integrity in drug development as well as in how the company promotes its products. They are in the best position to clarify and correct misleading corporate commentary, statements, or implications.

When integrity and objectivity of the science around a product are ensured, when scientists hold their management accountable for accurate and complete disclosures, and when they don’t let marketing and sales make misleading or false claims, then pharmaceutical industry physicians and scientists will provide the basis for restoring confidence and credibility in the work they are doing.  An organization that embraces integrity will value these physicians and scientists and reward them for keeping the company honest.  Unfortunately, companies that do not embrace integrity will probably find a reason fire these these physicians and scientists, if they don’t decide to quit first.

mike@pharmareform.com

The healthcare market is becoming increasingly demanding of the pharmaceutical industry to deliver products that are innovative and that can demonstrate clinically meaningful differentiation from currently available treatment options (including generic drug alternatives) .  This hurdle will become even more challenging as more mass market blockbuster products come off patent over the next five or so years.

The sources for these innovative products have historically been Pharma discovery research, start-up biotechnology companies, and university laboratories.  With a disappointing track record over the past decade or more, pharmaceutical companies have been narrowing their focus and downsizing their research efforts in favor of in-licensing technologies for development.  Looking for reduced risk and higher return on investment opportunities Pharma targets late stage technologies with proof of concept and a high probability of scientific and technical success.  Unfortunately, virtually every pharmaceutical company is now evaluating the same finite supply of technologies to find the few that fit the innovative, late stage, high probability of success profile.

Although one might expect a regular replenishing of the supply, this  should not be taken for granted.  While universities are fertile grounds for therapeutic concepts, targets, and interesting compounds,  few can afford or have the expertise to take potential drug candidates to proof of concept in a regulatory acceptable fashion that will mitigate the risk sufficient to warrant Pharma investment.   As a result, the diminishing supply of investment- worthy late stage programs is about to be exacerbated by the lack of adequate early stage discovery research funding.

At the same time, Biotech companies that can transform these promising technologies into viable development candidates have been starved for cash for the past two years making it nearly impossible to sufficiently fund new projects much less keep current programs adequately funded.  What this means is that the university/biotech pipeline of innovative new products that Pharma is counting on may soon become depleted if it isn’t already.

The obvious solution is for Pharma to accept more risk, invest much earlier, and collaborate.  Given the challenges of drug discovery research and the time required to get programs to proof of concept, Pharma may not have much time before the lack of discovery stage funding creates a gap in the flow of innovative pipeline products far greater than has ever been imagined.

mike@pharmareform.com

Pharmaceutical and biotech company marketers have always appreciated the impact they could have with pharmacoeconomic data to support the advertising and promotion of their products.  Unfortunately, it was rarely a prerequisite for commercial success and more often than not, done after product launch using retrospective database analysis and speculative modeling.  In the evolving new healthcare market that will change.  In an increasingly managed and cost conscious market, even innovative products with meaningful clinical differentiations from other therapeutic alternatives will be expected to substantiate the value of that differentiation.  So how do you deliver on those expectations?  You start early in development.

Pipeline project evaluation:

• What are the target product profile value drivers? Specifically, what are the points of differentiation;  the reasons why this product will be better than what is currently available or that might be available at the time of product launch?
• What are the plans for proving that these points of differentiation are clinically real and meaningful?
• Will it be possible to include these points of differentiation in regulatory labeling (package insert) so they can be used in marketing programs?
• Can marketing ascribe a quantitative value (cost benefit) to these points of differentiation?  What are they worth to the patient, to healthcare providers, and to the payer?
• Have you modeled the potential value of the differentiation and the minimum comparative value that is going to be meaningful to payers?  At what point, does the differentiation no longer have meaningful value?

Clinical development:

• Are trials designed to deliver data to prove the points of differentiation?
• Are the trials designed to capture the quantitative value of the differentiation?  Have credible, valid pharmacoeconomic metrics been used?
• Have you eliminated bias from the quantitative design elements?
• Have you built in conservative pricing assumptions and options?  Are they sufficient to allow for valid sensitivity analysis?
• Will the value assessment be reproducible in the real world?

This approach relies heavily on the marketing team understanding the value expectations of the market, the competitive value propositions, and the impact of pricing on the value proposition model.

The research teams must look at not only trial designs from a regulatory perspective but also must be accountable for delivering the definitive proof of differentiation and the data to support the quantitative comparative value (pharmacoeconomics).

Many pharmaceutical marketers do a series of market research studies and then typically set a price based on competition and “what the market will bear”. They then try to justify the value when they go to market.  Now, marketers will need to appreciate, very early on, the relationship between the price they set and the value they can prove based on that pricing and the available clinical and pharmacoeconomic data.   Comparative value assessments by payers will be data driven and will not be influenced by marketing hype.

I’m certain that some who have read this post will think that this process is idealistic, impractical, and some might even argue it is not necessary.  That is might be true until they realize their competitors who are developing comparative value data are creating a substantial competitive advantage and increasing the probability for more ready access to drug formularies at premium prices.

mike@pharmareform.com