Tag Archives: “comparative efficacy”

Why so many Surprising Disappointments from Pharmaceutical R & D?

FDA rejections of new drug applications (insufficient efficacy or safety data), totally unexpected drug failures in Phase III trials,  bewildering “no significant differences” demonstrated in comparative trials, eye opening safety issues in late stage trials or raised by FDA Advisory Boards.  In many cases, negative results sufficient to delay approval if not “kill the drug.”

Along with these stories come the unscientific rationalizations of failures. “That’s drug development.”  “High risk, high reward.” “Biology is complicated.” “Diseases we are trying to treat today are far more complex.”

These are not new headlines for the pharmaceutical industry.  In fact, and unfortunately, they have almost become a cultural industry expectation. Patients ride the roller-coaster of hope and disappointment while investors, also frustrated, keep hoping for that occasional “big win” that makes it all worthwhile.

The pharmaceutical and biotech industries have to find a better R & D model before patients lose faith and investors no longer feel that the “drug discovery and development lottery” is worth playing.

How many more times can Big Pharma place big bets on “promising“ compounds with limited “proof of concept” only to find out they have been sold worthless technology that can’t even make it through a traditional development program to gain market approval?

How many Pharma pipelines boast the number of compounds in development merely to demonstrate that they have something worth investing in, while knowing full well most of the compounds have little or no chance of really making it to market or producing a profit?

How many compounds in these Pharma pipelines (or biotech compounds for that matter) have been strategically developed so as to embellish the efficacy “potential” without exposing or exploring the design flaws that might compromise this “potential?”  How many of these compounds have been carefully tested so as to avoid any suggestions of toxicity that might be difficult to explain or might raise concerns during a “Big Pharma due diligence” (for biotech) or worse, during a regulatory review?

But many of you might be thinking…well that’s just the way pharmaceutical and biotech R & D is.  Well, you’re right… it is and it has worked for decades when the benefits of drug treatment (versus no treatment) outweighed the risks and the market was far more receptive to paying for mediocre “follow-on” products?

Find a compound with biologic activity (remember “get a hit in high throughput screening?”), see if it causes any “apparent toxicity” (do the regulatory required testing but don’t look too hard beyond that) in a few animal models.  Do a quick Phase I trial to see if it causes any “apparent toxicity” in a few volunteers.  Your objective is to get into and out of Phase II (not to really understand what happens in Phase I or II).  Now, pick a dosage schedule and the easiest, fastest indication to establish a quick proof of concept. Then, if you’re a biotech company, find a Big Pharma to buy your compound and/or your company.  If no buyer, get more investment to start a Phase III trial.  If you’re a Big Pharma, push it into full-blown Phase III clinical trials as fast as possible on a timeline that shows investors your “quick to market” development strategy and then “hope for the best.”

The problem is that this historical Pharmaceutical/Biotech R & D model is no longer viable.  So what has to change?   mike@pharmareform.com

Comparative Effectiveness and the SATURN study Comparing Crestor with Lipitor

Comparative effectiveness studies like the recently reported SATURN study comparing Crestor® (rosuvastatin) with Lipitor® (atorvastatin) sponsored by AstraZeneca may on the surface appear to be a big win for patients (and prescription drug providers) especially those awaiting generic versions of Lipitor (anticipated by the end of this year).  The reported preliminary topline results show a numerical advantage favoring Crestor but no statistically significant difference in the primary endpoint of the study (change from baseline in percent atheroma volume (PAV) in a ≥40 mm segment of the targeted coronary artery as assessed by intravascular ultrasound).

The apparent implication from these results is that there is no difference between Crestor and Lipitor and therefore, when available, generic atorvastatin will work just as well as the brand Crestor.  Extrapolating this “no difference” conclusion for a single endpoint to the totality of efficacy for atorvastatin could result in significant cost savings for patients and providers of prescription drug benefits.  You would think this is great news for patients but I believe the ramifications of this study go well beyond cholesterol lowering agents and the impact on future sales of Crestor.

Because of the investor interest, high media visibility, the enormous healthcare cost savings potential, and the mass market served by cholesterol lowering agents I believe there will be significant fallout from this study that is not necessarily beneficial to patients.

First, there are undoubtedly going to be patients who could benefit from Crestor rather than atorvastatin but who will not be given that option.  Smaller patient populations may never be studied well enough to determine if there really are patients who might benefit from one product or another in the face of large comparative trials showing no statistically significant difference.

Second, company executives have always been, but will now be even more, reluctant to sponsor comparative effectiveness studies for established products even when they feel they have an opportunity to demonstrate a difference (as I believe was the case for AstraZeneca).  The requirement for “statistically significant” clinically meaningful differences may be too high a hurdle (and represent too much risk) when complex trial designs are expected to prospectively identify a specific primary endpoint for a patient population with considerable variability.  We may, in an ideal world, feel we know enough about biology, disease pathophysiology, pharmacology, and the nuances of patient populations to be able to precisely design these definitive trials, but we probably don’t for most diseases.

Third, pharmaceutical companies may prematurely stop developing drugs they feel might not be able to demonstrate statistically significant differences to available therapeutic agents.  This would have been a catastrophe for antivirals HIV/AIDS treatments which we now know work best as cocktails of several products rather than one being “statistically  significantly “ better than another.  To further complicate this, regulatory approval studies are designed to establish efficacy and safety, not superiority.  I believe the need for demonstrating a statistically significant difference to meet market expectations and regulatory requirements for making a superiority claim (or to potentially gain approval) will make drug development near impossible where products already exist and efficacy is well established.

And if you are thinking about developing an as effective but “safer” product, good luck.  Regulatory requirements for claiming “safer” are even more challenging and from what I have seen, near impossible.

Lastly, this market expectation for demonstrating “superiority to available treatments” and regulatory requirements for making those claims, I believe will result in fewer therapeutic options for treating specific diseases (think antibiotic drug development over the past decade).  We are getting to a point where if a product is already available to treat a disease,  clinicians and payers want to know if your new product is better.  You would think this is not an unreasonable expectation, but it is an expectation that increases the cost, complexity, and uncertainty of drug development.

At the same time, pharmaceutical companies that demonstrate statistically significant differences for their branded products in comparative effectiveness trials will be able to command “super premium pricing” with an almost monopolistic “treatment of choice” position for the duration of their patent.  When a product demonstrates a clear benefit (statistically significant) over other treatments the bar is  raised for subsequent new products to demonstrate statistically significant superiority.  For products with trial supported superiority, regulators will have no choice but to allow superiority claims,  physicians will have little choice but to prescribe the product, and payers will have little choice but to provide reimbursement.  Unfortunately,  this also dampens drug development interest in therapeutic categories that already have well established “treatments of choice.”

And while we may have more effective and potentially safer products in the future,  if you think prescription drug prices are high now, just wait for these products that establish “treatment of choice” with clinically meaningful statistical differences.    mike@pharmareform.com

Was Antibiotic Development a Casualty of Comparative Effectiveness Expectations?

As early as the mid- to late- 1980s the market started to become increasingly managed (think formularies) and the availability of many inexpensive generic antibiotics even then made it easy to set superiority expectations for new market entries.

About the same time, the widespread use of antibiotics rightfully started to raise concerns with the Infectious Disease community about the development of resistance.  Armed with microbiology data and clinical studies, formularies and treatment guidelines were developed to encourage appropriate antibiotic use.  Selectively targeted narrow spectrum treatments were preferred to the mindless routine use of broad spectrum agents.  To preserve their antimicrobial activity, the use of some uniquely effective agents was further restricted to prior approval by Infectious Disease specialists.

While these were responsible and commendable actions taken, they presented the pharmaceutical industry with a new set of expectations for developing antibiotics. The message was clear.  If you want your new antibiotic to be used and you want to be paid a premium price for it, you better have the data (comparative effectiveness) to support that it is better than what we already have (including generic alternatives) and be able to prove it is worth the money (comparative value) you want to charge.  And, even if it is that good and costs that much, we are going to make sure it is used selectively in only those patients who absolutely need it.

This wasn’t and still isn’t a very attractive investment opportunity for the industry given the ease of tweaking molecules and the lack of market resistance in other therapeutic categories. Even for companies that decided to have a go at antibiotic drug development, it hasn’t been a very easy road to market.  The few products that have gotten approved and done well were able to demonstrate or at least imply a clinical advantage over other drugs.

Now the industry and the FDA are faced with trying to figure out how to design trials that would allow for fair comparisons of different antibiotics.  Not satisfied with clinical “non-inferiority” the FDA and the industry seem deadlocked in trial design limbo.  More importantly for the industry, the market expectation is for superiority anyway. The company will need near impossible – to – obtain “substantial evidence” in their clinical data to obtain an FDA approved superiority claim needed to promote the antibiotic as superior.

Could other therapeutic categories become similarly unattractive for drug development?  When market expectations and regulatory hurdles become impractical and seemingly financially infeasible pharmaceutical companies will make one of two choices.  They will take on the task in hopes of beating the challenging circumstances so they can charge a super premium price when they bring that superior product to market.   Or, more likely, they will gravitate to therapeutic categories with lower market expectations and fewer regulatory hurdles.

Many pharmaceutical companies will fail making the first choice and many diseases will never have optimal treatments given the second choice.

mike@pharmareform.com

Have pharmaceutical representatives been expected to fill label claim and data voids?

So what keeps representatives from having more engaging, more informative, and more credible discussions with physicians?  One of the most frequent reasons, or excuses, I hear about is the regulatory constraints placed on representatives.  Regulatory restrictions get in the way of being more effective as a sales representative when opportunities for product use exceed the label claims or where representatives could drive more sales by implying or even making comparative claims they can’t support with label claims or “substantial evidence.”

To ensure regulatory compliance, many companies, especially those with Department of Justice Corporate Integrity Agreements, now require representatives to stick to verbatim scripted presentations that mostly do not resonate well with physicians.  This “regurgitation of the company message” is an immediate turnoff for physicians, lacks credibility, and makes for awkward representative – physician interactions.

Now, keep in mind the premise of our discussion here. You are a professional representative and your mindset and focus is on making sure patients in your territory are getting the best treatment possible.  You are not just “driving sales” by doing and saying whatever it takes to get physicians to prescribe your product as much as possible.   Professional representatives don’t need to be reminded of fair balance or to stick to label claims and approved literature, they just do.  The challenge for them is whether or not they have the claims and sufficient regulatory compliant data and literature to meet the information needs of their customers.

Some sales representatives might suggest that they have all they need in terms of claims and published data and regulatory is just getting in the way.  If that is the case, then why would there be a regulatory compliance issue?  Why is regulatory review such a big deal?  Why would companies and representatives feel a need to promote off-label to make their sales? Why would companies feel compelled to script boring marketing messages to ensure sales representative compliance? More importantly, why is the market still clamoring for more comparative trials and better data to help them identify best treatment options for patients?

In this competitive market and knowing that products we now have were developed with a “get it to market “ mentality and indication – driven clinical trials to satisfy regulatory requirements for safety and efficacy, I’m going to suggest you do not have the claims or data you need.  How many of your products have two well controlled comparative efficacy trials to support claims of differentiation that you can use in sales presentations?  Can you claim superiority?  If not, how can you discuss why your product is better than another for a particular patient type? Can you do this and be compliant with regulatory requirements or are you expected to just cleverly implying a difference?

Here is the problem.   Even today, research gets the indications and it is up to marketing and sales to differentiate the product in the market.  When a physician or managed plan decision-maker asks why they should use your product rather than a competitive product, how do you answer?  Blatant claims of superiority or implied differentiation are the only way to convince them why your product should be used over another product.

What’s interesting is that when research and management talk about products to investors or in company presentations, especially before launch, they talk about and always answer questions about how the product is better than anything else out there, often using historical data from competitive products compared to their just released clinical data.  They highlight all the wonderful features and benefits that your product has over the competition, even quote data that imply superiority.

But, when marketing and sales wants to take those same messages to the market they have this regulatory issue.  While the research and management statements may be true,  they don’t necessarily come with the label claims or “substantial evidence” to support those same claims in advertising and promotion.  Yet, revenue forecasts are driven off those claims and expectations for differentiation.   And besides, who ever launched a product that wasn’t considered by their research team and management to be better than anything out there?

Pharmaceutical companies can no longer expect, pharmaceutical representatives to fill the label claim and “substantial evidence” data void for products.  The disconnect between product differentiation assumptions used for revenue forecasts and the regulatory constrained messaging puts the representative in an unfair position of having to deliver sales expectations beyond that which would be or ever could be achievable given a compliant presentation.

To be effective, even professional representatives need regulatory compliant information, comprehensive label claims, and more importantly, “substantial evidence” documented in peer-reviewed published literature.  This is the responsibility of management and the research team.  It is then marketing’s responsibility to develop forecasts that are aligned with the label claims and regulatory compliant information available for presentations and discussions by representatives.   mike@pharmareform.com

Can Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives Still Add Value?

If we are trying to figure out how sales representatives can add value, we must start with those who will determine whether or not there is value being added… the customer.  This may be obvious to some, especially sales representatives, but over the past several decades pharmaceutical industry management has characterized the “value added” in the context of what sales representatives can do for the company or the product and not what sales representatives can do for the customer.  So let’s start with the customer (which is not just physicians in the evolving new healthcare market) and what their needs are and how we can add value by meeting or exceeding those expectations.

I don’t want to get off on a tangent but the needs and expectations I’m talking about here are not for things like lunches being delivered or a return of the tchotchkes.  Unfortunately, the industry trained physician offices into developing these expectations in lieu of meaningful clinical discussions about products.

So let’s review some of the evolving market expectations for pharmaceuticals that the industry must be ready to meet, especially in light of healthcare reform:

  • Safe and effective products that can be differentiated (clinically proven and with label claims where possible) from currently available treatment options (including preventive medicines)
  • A clear understanding with supportive data for the basic science behind the product, its mechanism of action, and rationale for efficacy and potential side effects and adverse reactions.
  • Clinical data to support “comparative efficacy” and other claims of differentiation or even superiority (justify the premium pricing)
  • Personalized medicine supported by biomarkers and companion diagnostics that can predict response, determine extent of response, and anticipate side effects and adverse reactions with specificity and accuracy
  • Real world pharmacoeconomics data to support the economic value of the product and pricing that reflects the value being delivered. Again, justify the premium pricing.
  • Hospitals will want data and methodologies to demonstrate the impact of products on newly established quality metrics and outcomes data that will be used to force rank their institution performance against national standards.

One of the first implications of meeting these more demanding market expectations is that pharmaceutical companies must readjust their thinking to be more selective in their pipeline evaluations and  a lot more comprehensive in their approach to research and development.  In the past, you could just find a compound, identify the potential indications for use, do the clinical studies, get approval, and go to market.  This traditional “get it to market” approach to R & D will deliver products and data that fall short of market expectations and hamper commercial viability of products in the evolving new healthcare market.

It also becomes apparent that regardless of the representative’s scientific or technical expertise, even the best of sales representatives will struggle to address these market expectations if the research foundation and data are lacking.  I believe this is one of the reasons sales representatives are struggling today.  Pharmaceutical research has not kept pace with the demands of the market and sales representatives are being asked to compensate for limited regulatory product labeling, a lack of product differentiation, and minimal real world clinical data that can be used in product discussions.

But let’s assume your company is committed to a much more comprehensive research approach to deliver truly innovative new products with robust data packages.  This has significant implications for how pharmaceutical sales representatives can add value for customers.   You might be surprised by some of the implications we’ll discuss in our next post.  mike@pharmareform.com

Commercially Successful Off-label Promotion Should be an Embarrassment to the Medical Profession

While there are legitimate cases of last resort off-label prescribing (especially in oncology), many examples that have been brought to the attention of the courts that are not desperate attempts to find a viable treatment where nothing else has worked. To the contrary, the commercial success of off-label prescribing that has led to billions of dollars of incremental revenue for pharmaceutical companies should be an embarrassment for academics, healthcare providers, professional medical societies, and medical education providers.  Why should they be embarrassed?

They should be embarrassed because many of these cases demonstrate that the medical profession has no effective way to educate physicians about prescription drugs.  More importantly, it demonstrates that the evaluation process used by physicians to select treatments for their patients is less than rigorous and not necessarily based on package insert information, a critical evaluation of clinical data, or the literature.  Simple “show me the data” requests with a diligent comparative evaluation should have revealed the data gaps and more importantly, exposed the marketing hype and sales slight of hand for many of these campaigns.  How embarrassing for the medical establishment to have to face suggestions from litigation that pharmaceutical sale representatives and paid physician advocates have the skill and ability to influence prescribing practice without even having legitimate clinical proof of efficacy.

Rather than reveling in the success of winning billions of dollars in fines and settlements levied against the pharmaceutical industry, the plaintiffs and the medical profession should see this as a disturbing scorecard of medical education ineffectiveness and the inability of practicing physicians to critically evaluate prescription drugs for use in their practice.

It is also ironic and very disconcerting that states, private insurance companies, and even the federal government (CMS), all of whom espouse rigorous expert formulary evaluation processes, willingly encourage this prescribing by paying for these off-label uses without approved label claims or even supportive clinical data.  These very same organizations however, find it lucrative to sue pharmaceutical companies for what is actually their own lack of due diligence (no clinical proof of efficacy or safety required), ineffective medical education processes, and lax prescribing oversight (more than just a few cases needing this product off-label might have raise concerns).

There are five simple solutions for preventing pharmaceutical companies from enhancing their sales from off-label promotion. These five actions would make it less attractive, less tempting, and less profitable for pharmaceutical companies to even consider off-label promotion.

  • If the government, insurers, or plan mangers don’t approve of off-label prescribing, they shouldn’t pay for off-label uses.  If they decide to pay, they should not be allowed to sue the pharmaceutical companies for their own negligence in product assessments, inability to control prescribing, or ineffectiveness of their medical education processes.
  • Physicians should be required by law to inform patients that they are being prescribed a product off-label for their condition.  If the patient agrees to the treatment, they should not be allowed to sue the pharmaceutical company for any reason related to the use of that product.
  • Physicians merely have to be more demanding for data and rigorous in their evaluation of off-label claims made by sales people and paid physician advocates.  If they agree to use the product off-label, they should assume all liabilities related to its use.
  • Academia and medical education providers should be doing a much better job of teaching physicians about treatment options and challenging, even debunking off-label claims being made by pharmaceutical companies.
  • Academics and practicing physicians should be writing articles in medical journals that challenge the off-label claims being promoted by pharmaceutical companies.

If the market feels it is inappropriate to use prescription drugs off-label, that it results in the inappropriate overuse of higher priced prescription products, and therefore contributes to inflated healthcare costs, then the market should do its part and take responsibility for better educating the physician population and better manage the off-label use of prescription drugs.

mike@pharmareform.com

Delivering on Comparative Value Expectations for the Healthcare Market

Pharmaceutical and biotech company marketers have always appreciated the impact they could have with pharmacoeconomic data to support the advertising and promotion of their products.  Unfortunately, it was rarely a prerequisite for commercial success and more often than not, done after product launch using retrospective database analysis and speculative modeling.  In the evolving new healthcare market that will change.  In an increasingly managed and cost conscious market, even innovative products with meaningful clinical differentiations from other therapeutic alternatives will be expected to substantiate the value of that differentiation.  So how do you deliver on those expectations?  You start early in development.

Pipeline project evaluation:

  • What are the target product profile value drivers? Specifically, what are the points of differentiation;  the reasons why this product will be better than what is currently available or that might be available at the time of product launch?
  • What are the plans for proving that these points of differentiation are clinically real and meaningful?
  • Will it be possible to include these points of differentiation in regulatory labeling (package insert) so they can be used in marketing programs?
  • Can marketing ascribe a quantitative value (cost benefit) to these points of differentiation?  What are they worth to the patient, to healthcare providers, and to the payer?
  • Have you modeled the potential value of the differentiation and the minimum comparative value that is going to be meaningful to payers?  At what point, does the differentiation no longer have meaningful value?

Clinical development:

  • Are trials designed to deliver data to prove the points of differentiation?
  • Are the trials designed to capture the quantitative value of the differentiation?  Have credible, valid pharmacoeconomic metrics been used?
  • Have you eliminated bias from the quantitative design elements?
  • Have you built in conservative pricing assumptions and options?  Are they sufficient to allow for valid sensitivity analysis?
  • Will the value assessment be reproducible in the real world?

This approach relies heavily on the marketing team understanding the value expectations of the market, the competitive value propositions, and the impact of pricing on the value proposition model.

The research teams must look at not only trial designs from a regulatory perspective but also must be accountable for delivering the definitive proof of differentiation and the data to support the quantitative comparative value (pharmacoeconomics).

Many pharmaceutical marketers do a series of market research studies and then typically set a price based on competition and “what the market will bear”. They then try to justify the value when they go to market.  Now, marketers will need to appreciate, very early on, the relationship between the price they set and the value they can prove based on that pricing and the available clinical and pharmacoeconomic data.   Comparative value assessments by payers will be data driven and will not be influenced by marketing hype.

I’m certain that some who have read this post will think that this process is idealistic, impractical, and some might even argue it is not necessary.  That is might be true until they realize their competitors who are developing comparative value data are creating a substantial competitive advantage and increasing the probability for more ready access to drug formularies at premium prices.

mike@pharmareform.com

Healthcare Reform Comparative Effectiveness will really mean Comparative Value

Most Big Pharma development programs focus on regulatory requirements for FDA approval.  Makes sense.  There is no commercial value in a product that can’t get approved.  Healthcare reform and the evolving new market, however, are going to impose another level of expectations that go well beyond FDA product approval.

Big Pharma research teams often develop elaborate target product profiles that provide the reasons for developing drugs in the first place.  New mechanisms, less of this or more of that, better dosing schedule or something that makes the product worth developing.  These profiles often provide the theoretical rationale for why the product is better than what is out in the market.  These points are also highlighted every time a budget is reviewed to support continued investment in the product.  Unfortunately, few development plans reflect “proving” these points of differentiation.  Being able to demonstrate “better” for your product compared to other therapeutic options, including generic drug alternatives is rarely part of a regulatory path to approval.  In fact, being “as good as” or “not worse than” is the statistical goal of most programs.

So holding research teams accountable to deliver the “differentiation” proof and data would be one place to start, especially in the face of market expectations for “comparative effectiveness” studies.  But here is the real kicker.  Even if they can demonstrate some clinically meaningful superiority to an available alternative treatment that doesn’t ensure market acceptance with widespread adoption or that the product will become the “treatment of choice.”   I’m not talking about product launch failures or poor commercial execution issues here.

Once the company has demonstrated (solid clinical data) a clinically meaningful difference it will have to have data to show that the difference is worth paying for.  This will be especially challenging when the alternatives are less expensive generic drugs.  I can hear the formulary verdict already.  “We have determined that your product is clinically better than the treatment options available to us but the price difference doesn’t’ justify including your product on our formulary.”  What the market will really be asking for is “comparative value” data.

We’ll discuss what companies should be doing to deal with this in the next post.

mike@pharmareform.com

Strong science makes for more credible marketing and sales

We live in the reality of a world where skillful chemistry and quick structural modifications can develop new but similar drugs.  Some of these new products may provide benefits such as avoiding  side effects or reduced dosing schedules.  But for many, these products create one of the biggest challenges facing pharmaceutical marketing today.  Being able to develop and establish meaningful product differentiation.  In most cases, the lack of sufficient clinical data to support the desired claims makes this near impossible  within the confines of regulatory constraints.  Without clear, science supported product differentiation; marketers are left to creativity and expensive high visibility market presence to create a competitive advantage.  Sometimes this involves stretching the data and claims as far as you can get away with from a regulatory and legal perspective. Sometimes this means outspending your competition to make sure your product gets sufficient market exposure  to create demand.  Sometimes it means competing on price.

There are two solutions to this dilemma.  The first is for R & D to deliver truly innovative new products with the clinical data to substantiate the novelty and value. The second is spending more money doing clinical studies upfront on products that are suspected of having some element of differentiation. Design trials that can support the claims you want to make and make certain the studies and results have the scientific rigor to pass regulatory muster and are sufficiently compelling to make it easy for your marketing staff to communicate the differentiation without exaggeration.

I realize neither of these solutions helps those with difficult to differentiate products today.  Unfortunately, you are left with traditional tactics for trying to create that competitive advantage.  This situation does, however, point out the importance of experienced marketing input to R & D…early.  As the market expectations increase for differentiation (remember “comparative effectiveness”?), building a strong scientific foundation around the product claims you want to make will become essential for commercial success.  The days of clever marketing and sales to “push” products into the market are limited.   Spend the money upfront on more and better clinical studies and increase the credibility of your marketing and sales.

mike@pharmareform.com

Electronic information implications for pharmaceutical companies

Drug information sharing in the past provided an important role for sales reps, Medical Science Liaisons, and even journal advertising.  Even back in the mid-1980’s I remember doing online research (think dumb terminal with phone couplers) for infectious disease experts in their offices.  For most, their only alternative to get this information was to sit with the Med School reference librarian and try to figure out how to get what the physician needed from the National Library of Medicine database.  Searching was actually a skill back then.  This was probably as cutting edge at the time as you could get for information retrieval and sharing.

With the advent of the internet, robust search engines, and the pervasive availability of electronic retrieval devices, calling on physicians to do literature searches became limited in value.  Now these experts can do their own searches from their own computers. What’s the point?

For the industry to add value through information sharing, it is going to take more than sending a sales rep or MSL to see a physician with basic company product information.  Most companies realize this and have moved to take advantage of the internet, e-learning, e-prescribing, and television. In time however, this will also get old, build skepticism, and diminish in value as marketers abuse these tools, trying to cleverly hype  their product advantages, and overcommercialize their products with bold intrusive branding.

So what’s the solution?  Better science.  FDA approved label claims for what you want to say about your product and strong definitive clinical data to support the claims.  Peer reviewed presentations and publications with full disclosure and fair balance of data to support the benefits and risks. If you want to claim superiority, do the studies, get the claims, or at the very least, have credible data from reproducible controlled trials.

Then use whatever electronic communications you chose to disseminate your data.   This is not to say you don’t need marketing or sales to promote your product.  Professional, data supported claims merely provide a more credible base for promotion.  No hype required. You could even have life science trained medical personnel who can discuss in detail, on a peer basis, the nuances of the data and what they mean. If these people can not stand in front of a medical conference and defend their presentations, comments, or the implications of the data being presented, they should not be presenting in a one-on-one setting either.  A very tough standard, perhaps.  But, a lot more credible than the industry has provided healthcare providers in the past.

mike@pharmareform.com